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POE v. STATE: THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYlAND

LIMITS THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF
TRANSFERRED INTENT
1.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of transferred intent has been labeled everything
from an "arrant, barefaced fiction"l to "something of a freak"2 because it allows a person to be held criminally liable for harm done
to one person as a result of an act done with the intent to harm another. 3 The doctrine has been viable since the early English common law. 4
Today most states, including Maryland, recognize the doctrine
of transferred intent because it allows a state to punish someone
who unintentionally injures another in the process of intentionally
attempting a criminal act. The rationale behind the doctrine is that
a criminal should not escape punishment if, because of poor aim c;>r
mistaken identity, the crime was committed against the wrong person. 5 Maryland cases illustrate that the doctrine is both a necessary
component of criminal law and that its usefulness and applicability
have not been fully explored. 6
1. William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REv. 650, 650 (1967).
2. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains And Losses Of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE LJ. 277,
295 n.42 (1994).
3. See Weinrib, supra note 2, at 295.
4. See Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501 (1996). The doctrine of transferred
intent originated in criminal law and evolved at a time when tort damages
were awarded during criminal prosecutions. See Prosser, supra note I, at 652.
William Prosser speculated as to why the criminal law rule carried over into
tort actions. See id. He opined that the reason may have been that a defendant
was prima facie liable as a trespasser when he caused bodily harm to another
unless he was able to prove he was innocent of fault, and this would be impossible if he intended to cause injury to a third party. See id. at 653-54.
5. See Poe, 341 Md. at 528, 671 A.2d at 503.
6. Compare Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 714, 625 A.2d 984, 999 (1993) (holding
that if a defendant intends to kill a specific person and instead wounds an unintended victim without killing either, he can only be convicted of attempted
murder and transferred intent does not apply), with Poe, 341 Md. at 530, 671
A.2d at 504 (holding that transferred intent applies because it is needed to
impose criminal liability for the murder of an unintended victim). The rationale behind the Ford court's holding was that the crime of attempted murder
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Poe v. State7 provided the Court of Appeals of Maryland with an
opportunity to develop the doctrine of transferred intent. The pri- .
mary issue in Poe was whether the doctrine of transferred intent applied to the death of the unintended victim, notwithstanding the
fact that the defendant actually hit and wounded the intended victim. 8 In addressing this issue, the court also addressed whether
transferred intent applies to a defendant's completed crime of attempted murder. 9
The doctrine of transferred intent is commonly applied in Maryland where a defendant shoots at but misses an intended victim
and instead kills an unintended victim. to In Poe, however, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland extended the scope of the doctrine. In a
case of first impression, the court held that the doctrine of transferred intent applies where a defendant, intending to kill one person, shoots and wounds that person, but the shot passes through
the intended victim and kills an unintended victim.ll
Part II of this Note discusses the doctrine of transferred intent
in general as well as various cases in which it has been applied by
several jurisdictions. Part III discusses the facts, issue, holding, and
rationale in Poe v. State. In Part IV, this Note analyzes the court's
holding and contends that the Court of Appeals of Maryland inadvertently stated that it is necessary for a death to have occurred in
order to invoke the doctrine. Finally, Part IV also reports and analyzes the concurring opinion and discuss the impact Poe will have
on Maryland law.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

was completed against the target, making transferred intent inapplicable because the doctrine is invoked only when the defendant does not complete a
crime against his intended victim. See Poe, 341 Md. at 530 n.2, 671 A.2d at 504
n.2.
341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501 (1996).
See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
See id.
See Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 330 A.2d 176 (1974). The general rule is
that whenever a person kills another intentionally, they are guilty of murder
with express malice unless justified. See WILLIAM L CLARK & WILLIAM L MAR·
SHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES 587 (6th ed. 1958). This principle is
applied when an individual kills one person but actually intended to kill another. See id.
See Poe, 341 Md. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
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BACKGROUND

A.

The Doctrine of Transferred Intent In General

169

Typically, the doctrine of transferred intent applies in what is
called the bad-aim situation. 12 Suppose A aims at B but misses and
hits C instead. 13 A is as guilty as if his aim had been accurate. 14 If A
possesses a first-degree murder state of mind as to B, then A commits first degree murder as to C according to the m~ority view. 15
Likewise, if A intends to injure B but misses B and injures C, A is
guilty of battery of GI6
These conclusions of law as to criminal liability for bad aim are
founded upon transferred intent.17 To be guilty of a crime against
C, A must intend to harm GI8 Because A intended to harm B, A's
intent is transferred from B to GI9 Thus, A, by this reasoning, actually did intend to harm C, and therefore A is guilty of the crime
against G20 Of course, A never really intended to harm C; it is not
necessary to pretend that he did to impose criminal liability upon
A.21 What is really meant is that when A acts (or omits to act) with
intent to harm B, but because of bad aim, A harms C, who he did
not intend to harm, the law considers A as guilty as if he harmed
his intended victim. 22 Crimes such as homicide, battery, arson, and
malicious mischief only require that defendant harm some victiman unintended victim will do just as well as an intended victim. 23
Simply put, the rationale is that one who intends to kill should
not escape responsibility for murder on account of the wrong per12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

& AuSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 283 (2d ed. 1986).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 284.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. "Sometimes a statute may be worded in such a way as to require for
guilt that the intended victim and the actual victim be one and the samee.g., 'whoever with a deadly weapon commits a battery on another with intent
to kill or maim such person is punishable .. .'." Id. at 284 n.46. Alternatively,
transferred intent statutes make it a crime to commit a crime " 'upon the person of another.' " Id.
WAYNE R LAFAVE
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son dying by their hand. 24 During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of Ohio succinctly articulated the underlying notion
of transferred intent: intention follows the bullet. 25 The court noted
that murder is defined as "to kill another," rather than to kill a specific person. 26 Therefore, the act of murder is complete when any
person is killed, not just when a specific person is killed. 27 The
court stated the end of the act shall be construed by the beginning
of it: "[T]he crime is as complete as though the person against who
the blow was directed had been killed. "28
The doctrine of transferred intent is a product of early English
common law. 29 At common law, courts held that the doctrine applies to cases where a third party has been fatally and non-fatally injured. The English courts' general acceptance of the theory behind
transferred intent was laid out in Regina v. Latimer. 30 The theory is
that a person who injures another person in the course of maliciously intending to harm a third person is guilty of general malice
towards the injured person. 31

B.

The Doctrine of Transferred Intent Outside of Maryland

Almost every jurisdiction within the United States has addressed
the applicability of transferred intent in a variety of settings. For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals articulated its po24. See Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 392, 330 A.2d 176, 181 (1974).
25. See Wareham v. State, 25 Ohio St. 601, 606-07 (1874) ("The intent to kill and
the malice follows the blow .... ").
26. [d. at 606.
27. See id. at 606-07.
28. [d. at 607.
29. See Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 390, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974). In 1776, the
framers of the Maryland Constitution adopted the common law of England as
part of the law of the state. See MD. CODE ANN .. CONST. art. 5 (1981 & Supp.
1996). Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights, which provides "[t]hat the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England," referred to
the common law as it existed in England except for portions that were inconsistent with our nation's new political institutions. See Gladden, 273 Md. at 389,
330 A.2d at 180. Thus, with the adoption of the Maryland Constitution, the
doctrine of transferred intent made the journey from England to Maryland.
30. See Poe, 341 Md. at 536-37,671 A.2d at 507 (citing Regina v. Latimer, 17 Q.B.D.
359 (1886»; accord State v. Thomas, 53 So. 868 (La. 1911).
31. See Thomas, 53 So. at 871 (citing Regina v. Latimer, 17 Q.B.D. 359 (1886».
Historically, courts held that the doctrine of transferred intent applied to fatal
and non-fatal injuries of bystanders. But cf. Poe, 341 Md. at 529, 671 A.2d at
504 (holding that transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder
when there is no death).
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sition on the doctrine of transferred intent in Ruffin v. United
States. 32 Ruffin and others fired shots at their intended victim,
Younger. 33 Younger was wounded, but the shots also killed Marcia
Williams and injured her son. 34 A jury convicted Ruffin of first degree murder of Williams, as well as assault with intent to kill
Younger and Williams's son. 35
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that where there are multiple victims from a single act,
there is an offense for every intended and unintended victim. 36 Because defendant's drive-by shooting resulted in a non-fatal injury to
the intended victim, a fatal injury to one bystander, and a non-fatal
injury to another bystander, the court held that the defendant's
conduct was sufficient to impose responsibility using transferred intentY The court reasoned that the manner in which the defendant
committed the crime against the targeted victim created a zone of
danger. 38
Parallel to Ruffin, the New Mexico Court of Appeals followed
the same logic when it applied transferred intent to attempted murder in State v. Gillette. 39 In Gillette, the court upheld the conviction of
the defendant for attempted murder of his intended victim as well
as two unintended victims. 40 Gillette left a package containing a can
of poisoned soda at his intended victim's workplace. 41 Subsequently,
two of the intended victim's co-workers also drank from the can.42
Holding that Gillette was criminally liable for attempted murder of
all three people, the court reasoned that it was irrelevant that none
of the victims were harmed. 43 The court noted that the threat to his
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.

642 A.2d 1288 (D.C. 1994).
See id. at 1290.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1298.
See id.
See id. (holding that defendant's reliance on Ford was misplaced because the
Ford dicta did not overrule the Wilson holding that transferred intent applies
to attempted murder of an intended victim and injured bystander).
699 P.2d 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
See Elaine T. Devoe, Note, The Use of Transferred Intent in Attempted Murder, a
Specific Intent Crime: State v. Gillette, 17 N.M. L. REv. 189, 189 (1987).
See id. at 189-90; if. People v. Gaither, 343 P.2d 799, 801 (Cal. App. 2d 1959)
(finding that a defendant sent poisoned candy to his ex-wife, but another person ate it).
See Devoe, supra note 40, at 190.
See id. at 194.
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unintended victims was real and was proof of Gillette's ability to kill;
therefore, Gillette's intent was transferred from his intended victim
to the unintended victims.44
Likewise, California courts have explored the usefulness of the
doctrine of transferred intent. In People v. Pivaroff,45 the court applied transferred intent under circumstances similar to Poe v. State.
The defendant grabbed a shotgun during an argument with his
wife. 46 The shots he fired wounded his wife and killed their childY
Despite the absence of intent to kill his child, PivarofI was convicted
of first degree murder. 48 The court explained that the law transferred Pivaroff's felonious intent because he attempted to kill a person, purposely and with malice aforethought. 49 Thus, intent to commit first degree murder does not vanish when the assailant kills the
wrong person. 50 More recently, the Supreme Court of California applied the doctrine of transferred intent to a drive-by shooting. The
court held that the defendants could be charged under the transferred intent theory for the death of an unintended victim notwithstanding the State's decision to charge the defendants with attempted murder of their intended victim.51 Consequently, California
is among those jurisdictions that apply the doctrine to first degree
murder when an unintended victim is killed.
Jurisdictions are split on whether the doctrine applies when the
defendant kills both the intended and unintended victims. 52 State v.
Worlock,53 a New Jersey case, stands for the proposition that the doctrine is appropriate when the defendant kills both the intended and
unintended victims. 54 In Warlock, the defendant fired shots that
killed his intended victim as well as an unintended victim who "got
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 193-94.
33 P.2d 44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
See id. at 44.
See id.
See id. at 45.
See id.
See id.
See California v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288 (Cal. 1996).
See, e.g., State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1324-25 (NJ. 1990) (applying transferred intent where both the intended and unintended victims were killed); if.
People v. Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321, 326 (Ct. App. 1974) (stating in dicta that
"the 'doctrine of transferred intent' applies even though the original object of
the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was ... accidental").
53. 569 A.2d 1314 (NJ. 1990).
54. See id.
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in the way. "55 The court held that the doctrine of transferred intent
applied notwithstanding that the defendant successfully killed his intended victim. 56 The New Jersey court reasoned that there was no
reason to limit the application of the doctrine to a situation in
which only the unintended victim is harmed. 57
Alternatively, in People v. Birreuta,58 a California court held that
where the intended victim has been killed, the doctrine is unnecessary.59 In Birreuta, the defendant accidentally shot and killed his wife
when he shot and killed his intended victim, a neighbor. 60 The Birreuta court noted that when the intended victim is killed, the doctrine is unnecessary because there is no danger that a defendant
will escape prosecution for a premeditated murder. 61 As for the
defendant's case, he failed to escape prosecution for first degree
murder, and thus the court said that the unintended death of his
wife should have been prosecuted as manslaughter or second degree murder.62
Courts have also held that transferred intent is inapplicable in
other circumstances. For example, where a defendant intends to kill
both victims, the doctrine is of no use. 63 Moreover, in California,
the doctrine does not apply where a defendant who is charged with
attempted murder of the intended victim also injured an innocent
bystander. 64 The California court explained that because the State
charged the defendant with attempted murder, the most serious
crime the defendant could be charged with under the circumstances, the doctrine was not needed for the injury to the unintended victim. 65 Essentially, the need for the doctrine is obviated
when it is clear that the defendant will not escape responsibility for
the completed crime against the intended victim. 66
55. [d. at 1317.
56. See id. at 1325.
57. See id.

58. 208 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Ct. App. 1984).
59. See id. at 639.
60. See id. at 637.
61. See id. at 639.
62. See id.
63. See People v. Hunter, 782 P.2d 608, 619-21 (Cal. 1990).
64. See People v. Calderon, 283 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Ct. App. 1991).
65. See id. at 836.
66. See id. In the case of mistaken identity, where a defendant kills the wrong person, transferred intent is inapplicable because the person killed is actually the
intended victim. See id.; see also People v. Williams, 162 Cal. Rptr. 748, 753-54
(Ct. App. 1980); WAYNE L. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT. JR. BASIC PREMISES OF
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Although many jurisdictions have recognized application of the
doctrine of transferred intent as a legitimate way to convict a
defendant of first degree murder of a person he did not intend to
kill, some jurisdictions invoke other doctrines in its place. 67 One approach is to apply the felony murder doctrine to convict an assailant of the murder of his unintended victim. 68 The felony murder
doctrine holds the assailant responsible for any crime committed in
the course of a felony.69 Since attempted murder is a felony, the assailant may be charged with the murder of his unintended victim. 70
A second alternative is to charge defendants with depraved
heart murder. 71 Depraved heart murder applies to cases where a
defendant exhibits an extreme indifference for the value of human
life.72 Thus, depraved heart murder may be applied to convict a
defendant who attempts to kill one person in the presence of a bystander and kills the bystander. 73
The third alternative to transferred intent is premised upon the
belief that the requisite intent to kill, necessary to convict someone
of murder, is merely an intent to kill another human being, rather
than an intent to kill a specific human being.14 Courts reason that
they are not transferring intent because it is simply present when a
person commits a crime. 75
Although each of these alternatives prevents a defendant from
escaping criminal responsibility for the unintended consequences of
his bad act, commentators and judges have noted that none of
these doctrines sufficiently replace the doctrine of transferred in-

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

CRIMINAL LAw § 87, at 252-55 (1972). But see Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685,
506 A.2d 580 (1986). In Grandison, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a
murder conviction under the doctrine of transferred intent where a killer
hired by the defendant mistakenly killed the wrong party. See id. at 696-97,
771-72, 506 A.2d at 585-86, 623-24.
See Symposium, Culpability and the Law: Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 65, 71 (1996) [hereinafter Symposium].
See id. at 71-72.
See id.
See id. at 72.
See id.
See id.; see also Model Penal Code § 210.2(1) (b) (1962).
See Symposium, supra note 67, at 72.
See id. at 73. For a discussion in favor of this alternative to transferred intent,
see JOSHUA DRESSLER. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 35 (2d ed. 1995). For a
criticism of Dressler's "abolitionist" approach, see Symposium, supra note 67,
at 74.
See Symposium, supra note 67, at 72-74.

1997]

Poe v. State

175

tent.1 6 Hence, transferred intent has served as the main approach
for dealing with intended harm to unintended victims because it allows courts to apply punishment that is proportionate to the seriousness of the crime intended and harm incurred. 77

C.

The Doctrine of Transferred Intent in Maryland

In Gladden v. State,78 the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted
the doctrine of transferred intent as the law of Maryland. 79 As such,
the doctrine of transferred intent was applied to both fatal and
non-fatal injuries of third parties. 80 The defendant wildly fired four
or five shots without hitting his intended victim but instead killing a
young boy. 8I The court held that the doctrine of transferred intent
applied because the defendant possessed the state of mind to commit the crime willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. 82 The
court reasoned that it was immaterial that the intended act affected
the wrong person. 83 Like the English courts, the Gladden court held
that the defendant could not be excused from responsibility because of his own bad aim. 84
In State v. Wilson,85 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
transferred intent applied to the crime of attempted murder.86 In
Wilson, the defendants fired shots at their intended victim, who
managed to escape unscathed. 87 An innocent bystander, however,
was shot and paralyzed, but he did not die. 88 The Wilson court held
that transferred intent applies to the crime of attempted murder.89
76. See id.
77. See id. at 92. Suppose there are two defendants. The first defendant successfully murdered his intended victim; the second defendant only attempted to
murder his intended victim but, in the process, murdered the wrong person.
See id. at 89. The level of seriousness of the two crimes is the same, and therefore transferred intent is required to ensure equal and proportionate
sentences for the two murders. See id. at 92.
78. 273 Md. 383, 330 A.2d 176 (1974).
79. See id. at 405, 330 A.2d at 189.
80. See id.
8!. See id. at 384-85, 330 A.2d at 177.
82. See id. at 404-05, 330 A.2d at 188.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 601-02, 546 A.2d at 1042.
88. See id. at 602, 546 A.2d at 1042.
89. See id. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045-46.
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The court indicated that the mens rerPo of a defendant as to his intended victim transfers over to determine his culpability for injury
to the unintended victim. 91
In Wilson, the court affirmed that transferred intent is not a
doctrine reserved solely for completed homicides; the doctrine applies to fatal and non-fatal injury to third parties. 92 The court explained that because a defendant's intent follows the bullet, that is
enough to invoke the doctrine. 93 The court also stated that a completed homicide is not required to apply transferred intent because
a defendant's state of mind determines his guilt-he is guilty of the
crime as if his aim had been more accurate. 94
Nonetheless, in Ford v. State,95 the court of appeals, in dicta, disavowed its application of transferred intent to attempted murder.96
In Ford, the defendant was found guilty of, inter alia, assault with intent to disable drivers after he hurled bricks at cars.97 The court
found transferred intent inapplicable as to the passengers in the

90. As an element of criminal responsibility, the term "mens rea" is defined as "a
guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent." See BlACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 680 (6th ed. 1991).
91. See Wil50n, 313 Md. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045-46. The Wilson court aligned itself
with several jurisdictions that have applied transferred intent to specific intent
crimes such as attempted murder. See People v. Neal, 218 P.2d 556, 559 (Cal.
1950) (upholding a conviction for attempted murder of an unintended victim
and holding that intent transfers as to non-fatal injuries); Norris v. State, 419
N.E.2d 129, 133-34 (Ind. 1981) (holding that transferred intent applies to attempted murder if the defendant intends to kill someone); State v. Gillette,
699 P.2d 626, 636 (N.M. 1985) (holding that leaving a poisoned drink for one
victim is sufficient to constitute an attempted murder on each unintended victim who drank from it).
92. See Wilson, 313 Md. at 603'{)4, 546 A.2d at 1043.
93 .. See id.
94. See id. at 604, 546 A2d at 1043.
95. 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993).
96. See id. at 714, 716, 625 A.2d at 999, 1000. The Ford court theorized that Wilson
actually involved concurrent intent as opposed to transferred intent. See id. at
716, 625 A.2d at 1000. Concurrent intent includes situations where the defendant has specific intent toward one person and creates a kill zone where the
defendant places everyone within that zone in danger to ensure harm to the
intended victim. See id. at 716-17, 625 A.2d at 1000-01. Firing several bullets
from two handguns, as Wilson did, was sufficient to create a kill zone under
the theory of concurrent intent. See id; if. Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 743,
517 A.2d 94, 97 (1986) (noting that depraved heart murder does not require a
specific intent to kill).
97. See Ford, 330 Md. at 690, 709, 625 A.2d at 987,997.
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cars because the crime as to the intended victims was complete. 9s In
other words, where the crime intended has actually been committed, the court stated that transferred intent is unnecessary and
should not be applied to unintended victims. 99 Accordingly, the Ford
court concluded, albeit in dicta, that attempted murder was a completed crime committed on the intended victim, and hence transferred intent is inapplicable. 'oo The majority stated that charging a
defendant with attempted murder of a bystander when the State already charged the defendant with attempted murder of the intended victim duplicates the intent instead of transferring it.101 The
court reasoned that transferred intent should not multiply criminal
liability.,o2 Rather, it should provide an avenue to hold a defendant
responsible for a crime whereby all the elements, except intent,
were committed upon the wrong victim. 103
In a concurring opinion, Judge McAuliffe questioned the Ford
majority's limitation on the doctrine of transferred intent. '04 Judge
McAuliffe opined that the doctrine should not be held inapplicable
to attempted murder simply because the defendant completed a
crime. lOS Suppose, Judge McAuliffe wrote, "[a] defendant, intending
to kill A, shoots and wounds him, but the bullet passes through A
and kills B."I06 In this particular situation, he reasoned, the majority's theory would be problematic because the defendant would be
guilty of Bs murder, while also guilty of the attempted murder of
A.107 According to the Ford majority, however, transferred intent is
not applicable because attempted murder is a completed crime
against the intended victim. lOS Furthermore, Judge McAuliffe asserted that if A also died, the majority's theory would require that
9S. See id.
99. See id. at 712, 625 A.2d at 99S.
100. See id. at 714, 625 A.2d at 999. The Ford majority asserted that attempted murder is a completed crime because the defendant can be convicted of the attempted murder of his victim. See id. Therefore, the defendant has not escaped culpability for his actions, and, in a case where the uniiltended victim
has not been killed, transferred intent is not needed to charge the defendant
with a crime. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 714, 625 A.2d at 999.
104. See id. at 724, 625 A.2d at 1004 (McAuliffe, j., concurring).
105. See id. (McAuliffe, j., concurring).
106. Id. at 726, 625 A.2d at 1005 (McAuliffe, j., concurring).
107. See id. (McAuliffe, j., concurring).
lOS. See id. at 716 n.14, 625 A.2d at 1000 n.14.

178

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

the defendant could not be convicted of the murder of B, but only
of a lesser crime such as manslaughter. 109 Thus, just prior to Poe v.
State, the court's dicta in Ford stood for the proposition that transferred intent does not apply to harm inflicted on an unintended
victim when the crime against the intended victim is "complete."
III.
A.

INSTANT CASE
Facts

On August 10, 1993, James Allen Poe (Poe) drove to the home
of his estranged wife, Karen Poe (Ms. Poe), to visit their children. llo
Though they did not have a formal visitation agreement, Ms. Poe
generally allowed Poe to visit the children whenever he wanted. lll
On that day, however, Ms. Poe refused to allow Poe to take the children because Poe intended to take them to Florida with his girlfriend. ll2 An argument ensued in front of the house, which escalated into a fight; finally, Poe shot his wife.ll3 The slug passed
through Ms. Poe's arm and continued on through the head of a sixyear-old girl named Kimberly Rice, who was standing in the background. ll4 Ms. Poe was injured; Kimberly was killed instantly.ll5 Poe
was convicted in the Circuit Court for Cecil County of the attempted murder of Ms. Poe and the murder of Kimberly.ll6 The
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction,ll7
and the court of appeals granted certiorarLllS Poe v. State allowed
the Court of Appeals of Maryland to address whether the doctrine
of transferred intent applies to a defendant's completed crime of attempted murder and whether the doctrine applies when a bullet
grazes the intended victim before mortally wounding an unintended
victim. ll9
The facts in Poe unfolded just as Judge McAuliffe theorized in
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 726, 625 A.2d at 1005 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
See Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 525-26, 671 A.2d 501, 502 (1996).
See id. at 525, 671 A.2d at 502.
See id. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502.
See id. The couple argued in front of the house until finally Poe retrieved his
shotgun from the car. See id. He fired toward the doorway where Ms. Poe was
standing and shouted, " Take this, bitch.' " [d. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502.
See id.
See id. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502.
See id. at 533, 671 A.2d at 505-06.
See Poe v. State, 103 Md. App. 136, 652 A.2d 1164 (1995).
See Poe, 341 Md. at 527, 671 A.2d at 503.
See id. at 525, 671 A.2d at 502.
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his concurring OpInIOn in Ford. 120 The bullet from Poe's shotgun
passed through his wife's arm and continued on to kill the innocent
bystander, Kimberly.121 The Poe court held that the doctrine of transferred intent applied to a gunshot passing through an intended victim and killing an unintended victim. 122
B.

Rationale

The court of appeals reasoned that the passing of the bullet
through Ms. Poe's arm before killing Kimberly did not alter or negate the application of transferred intent. 123 Poe argued that all of
his intent was "used up" when he completed the crime of attempted murder on his intended victim.124 The court reasoned,
however, that although the attempted murder was complete, Poe's
intent was to murder, not to attempt to murder.125 Therefore, Poe's
intent to kill transferred from Ms. Poe to Kimberly in what the
court called a "classic case of transferred intent."126
The Poe court noted that "transferred intent links a defendant's
mens rea as to the intended victim with the killing of an unintended
victim, and it effectively 'makes a whole crime out of two component halves.' "127 The Poe court highlighted that the purpose of
transferred intent is to prevent a defendant from escaping liability
for a murder in which all the elements have been committed but
there is an unintended victim. 128
The court restated its position in Ford that transferred intent
does not apply to atteJ)lpted murder.129 The court reasoned that
120. Compare Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 726, 625 A.2d 984, 1005 (1993) (McAuliffe,
J., concurring), with Poe, 341 Md. at 523,671 A.2d at 501 (observing that Judge
McAuliffe's hypothetical illustrated the problems the Poe court would face,
based on its opinion in Ford, if a bullet passed through the intended victim,
without killing that victim, only to continue on and kill a bystander). The
facts in Poe were virtually identical to Judge McAuliffe's hypothetical. See Poe,
341 Md. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502.
121. See Poe, 341 Md. at 525-26, 671 A.2d at 502.
122. See id, at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
123. See id. at 528-29, 671 A.2d at 503.
124. Id. at 528, 671 A.2d at 503. But see State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 597 (Conn.
1993) (holding that intent is not used up when the intended victim is killed
or when there are multiple deaths).
125. See Poe, 341 Md. at 528, 671 A.2d at 503.
126. Id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 503.
127. Id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 503-04 (quoting Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 710, 625
A.2d 984, 997 (1993».
128. See id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504.
129. See id. (disapproving of the application of the doctrine of transferred intent to
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transferred intent is a pure legal fiction because it imposes criminal
liability for an unintended death. 13o In support of its position, the
court drew an analogy to the doctrine of felony murder. 131 In homicide cases, both transferred intent and felony murder perform the
function of holding a defendant liable for unintended deaths that
result during the commission of a crime. 132 There is no crime of attempted felony murder, however, when death does not occur during the course of a felony.133 Likewise, the Poe court concluded that
the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when death does not result. 134
The court of appeals determined in Ford that if a defendant intends to kill a specific victim and instead wounds an unintended victim without killing either, transferred intent does not apply because
there is no death. 135 The defendant can be convicted only of the attempted murder of the intended victim. 136 However, if the defendant intends to kill one person and instead unintentionally kills another, transferred intent does apply to the death. 137 Under this
rationale, the Poe court concluded that the doctrine applied in the
instant case because Poe killed an unintended victim, Kimberly.138
Finally, the Poe court noted that under Gladden v. State,139 the
relevant inquiry in the poor aim situation was not.whether the gunshot hit or missed the intended victim, but rather what the defendant could have been convicted of had he accomplished his intended
act. 140 Therefore, transferred intent was applicable to Kimberly's killing because Poe could have been convicted of first degree murder
had he accomplished the act that he intended-the killing of his
wife. 141
Judge Raker wrote a concurring opinion because she disagreed
with the majority's narrow interpretation of the doctrine of trans-

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

attempted murder in State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988».
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 64647, 566 A.2d 103, 105 (1989).
See Poe, 341 Md. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504.
See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
273 Md. 383, 330 A.2d 176 (1974).
See id. at 393, 330 A.2d at 181.
See Poe, 341 Md. at 531, 671 A.2d at 505.
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ferred intent. 142 Judge Raker stated that transferred intent may be
applied to the fatal and non-fatal injuries of a bystander; in other
words, a death .is not required to invoke the doctrine. 143

IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

Critique of the Court's Holding and Rationale

The Poe majority found that because a death occurred, transferred intent applied where a gunshot passed through the intended
victim and killed an unintended victim.l44 Essentially, the majority
took the facts of this case and tacked on an artificial death requirement. 145 This logic in the Poe majority's reasoning exposed an incongruity in Maryland precedent. The court previously held in Wilson l46
that transferred intent applied to attempted murder of an unintended victim, rather than just completed homicides. 147 In Ford,148
the court stated that the doctrine of transferred intent cannot apply
when there is no death. 149 The Ford court reasoned that when a
defendant attempts to murder A l:mt injures B, there is no reason to
invoke the doctrine because the defendant is not escaping criminal
liability for the attempted murder of A.150 Thus, the doctrine is not
See id. at 534-35, 671 A.2d at 506-07 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id. at 540, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
See id. at 531 n.4, 671 A.2d at 505 n.4.
313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988).
See id. (applying transferred intent to attempted murder when there is no
death). The WiL50n court's position reflected the doctrine as it was carried
over to the United States from England. The doctrine has always been applied
"in a long array of cases in which poisoning, shooting, striking, or throwing a
missile resulted in injury to the wrong" person. Prosser, supra note I, at 652-53
(emphasis added). Historically, the question has been whether the unintended victim is injured at all, not whether a death occurred.
148. 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993).
149. See id. at 714, 625 A.2d at 999. The purpose behind the doctrine is to prevent
a defendant from escaping liability for an unintended murder in which every
element has been committed. See id. The degree of the crime and any defenses transfer with the intent. See Pinder v. State, 8 So. 837 (Fla. 1891) (degree); Mayweather v. State, 242 P. 864 (Ariz. 1926) (defenses); State v. Fielder,
50 S.W.2d 1031 (Mo. 1932) (defenses); State v. Stallings, 33 S.W.2d 914 (Mo.
1930) (defenses).
150. See Ford, 330 Md. at 714, 625 A.2d at 999. The court's position is contrary to
the idea of resting criminal liability upon the ground of transferred intent:
"To be guilty of a crime involving a harmful result to C; A must intend to do
harm to B; but A's intent to harm B will be transferred to C; thus A actually
did intend to harm C; so he is guilty of the crime against G." LAFAVE & SCOlT,
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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needed to charge the defendant with a crime. 151 Furthermore, the
defendant remains liable for injury caused to B, but not under the
doctrine of transferred intent. 152
Had Kimberly, Poe's unintended victim, only been injured, the
court would likely have declined to apply transferred intent because
the court considered transferred intent not to apply to attempted
murder when there is no death. 153 The court reasoned that just as
there is no such crime as attempted felony murder, there can be no
attempted crime through transferred intent. 154
This reasoning is flawed. A conviction for felony murder does
not require proving specific intent to kill; it requires proving the
specific intent to commit the underlying felony.155 Therefore, because criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, there is no crime
of attempted felony murder in Maryland. 156 Transferred intent, on
the other hand, is a specific intent crime. 157 Thus, a defendant who
attempts to kill their intended victim but instead injures an unintended victim should be held liable under transferred intent for attempted murder of the unintended, injured victim.
Along with the analogy to felony murder, the Poe court built its
holding from the groundwork it laid in Ford: "In Ford, we made
clear that if a defendant intends to kill a specific victim and instead
wounds an unintended victim without killing either, the defendant
can be convicted only of the attempted murder of the intended victim and transferred intent does not apply."158 Although the Poe
supra note 12, at 284.
151. SeeFard, 330 Md. at 716-17,625 A.2d at 100()"ol.
152. See id. The court's reluctance to apply transferred intent when the injury to
the unintended victim is not as serious as the injury to the intended victim
was contrary to general principles of criminal law. The law considers that regardless of whether the unintended victim is injured or killed, the defendant
is just as guilty as if he had harmed the intended victim. &e LAFAVE & SCOIT,
supra note 12, at 284.
153. See Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 529, 671 A.2d 501, 504 (1996). For a discussion
of the differences between felony murder and transferred intent, see Nelson
E. Roth & Scott E. Sunby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine At Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 453-57 (1985).
154. See Poe, 341 Md. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504.
155. See Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 646, 566 A.2d 103, 105 (1989).
156. See id.
157. Generally, transferred intent is not applicable when the defendant's state of
mind to commit the act does not constitute the specific mens rea for the offense charged. See ROLLINS M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 923
(3d. ed. 1982).
158. Poe, 341 Md. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504; see also Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 714,
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court stated that Ford was inapposite to the instant case and that it
only discussed Ford to explain why the defendant's reliance on that
case was misplaced, the court followed the logic in Ford. 159 The Poe
court reasoned that transferred intent applied because there was a
death and the doctrine was needed to impose criminal liability
upon Poe for that death.160 Because the defendant failed to complete the crime upon the targeted victim, but instead completed it
upon an unintended victim, the court concluded that transferred
intent applied in Poe. 161
As a result, the Poe court abandoned its holding in Wilson in
favor of the "death requirement" proposed in Ford. 162 Under Wilson,
the doctrine was invoked when the second crime against the unintended victim was as serious as the crime against the intended victim,163 relying on the theory that intent follows the bullet. l64 Under
Poe, however, the doctrine is reserved for cases where the unintended victim is killed and the intended victim is not. 165 Because the

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.

165.

625 Aid 984, 999 (1993). The court's limitation seems questionable when
compared to the following hypothetical: If A possessed the mens rea necessary
for a charge of attempted murder of B, but wounded C in the course of attempting to murder B, then it is permissible to charge A with the attempted
murder of C because A'!> state of mind to do the act constituted the mens rea
for the offense charged.
See Poe, 341 Md. at 531 n.4, 671 A2d at 505 n.4.
See id. at 530, 671 A2d at 504.
See id.
Ford, 330 Md. at 714, 625 A.2d at 999; see also Poe, 341 Md. at 530, 671 A.2d
504.
See State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 609, 546 A2d 1041, 1045 (1988) (holding that
the doctrine applies to attempted murder and the defendant's mens rea will
carry over when the conduct causes injury to an unintended victim).
See id. at 609, 546 A2d at 1046. A well-settled rule of criminallaw is that there
can be no crime without criminal intent. See WILliAM L. CLARK & WILliAM L.
MARsHALL. A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES 77 (Herschel Bouton Lazell ed.,
2d ed. 1996). At common law, an act is not considered a crime if the person
doing the act possesses an innocent state of mind. See id. Thus, the law hesitates to punish persons who are mentally incapable of understanding the implications of their actions (e.g., children and insane people) or who are acting
in good faith. See id. at 78. It follows that a person who purposefully commits
an act shall be punished based upon his guilty state of mind to commit the
crime regardless of whether that person successfully executed the crime. Generally, to constitute a criminal intent, it is not necessary that the person intended the particular results for which he is punished. See id. at 84.
Compare Poe, 341 Md. at 531, 671 A2d at 505 (holding that transferred intent
applies only when there is an unintended death), with CLARK & MARsHALL,
supra note 164, at 84 ("[AJ homicidal act, taking effect on a person other
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court's holding limited the applicability of transferred intent to
crimes where death results, Judge Raker wrote a concurring opinion
to clarify what she believed the majority intended to hold. l66

1.

Alternative Approaches

Judge Raker explained why the majority's reliance on Ford was
misguided. She considered the majority's statement that "transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no
death" to be too broad. 167 Judge Raker opined that transferred intent should not be applied to attempted murder if no one is
injured. 168
To arrive at this conclusion, Judge Raker examined the court's
treatment of the Wilson l69 opinion in Ford. She noted that in Ford
the doctrine of transferred intent arose only as a collateral issue. 170
The central issue in Ford was whether the evidence was sufficient for
a jury to find that the defendant possessed the specific intent to disable which was necessary for a conviction of assault with intent to
disable.171 The issue of transferred intent merely formed an alternative basis for affirming the conviction.172 Accordingly, Judge Raker
contended that Ford only questioned the rationale for the court's
decision in Wilson, which recognized the application of the transferred intent doctrine to attempted murder. 173 Therefore, she noted,
Ford could not and did not overrule Wilson. 174

166.
167.

168.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

than the one whom the slayer intended, makes [the actor] guilty of the same
degree of homicide of which he would have been guilty had the person intended been slain.").
See Poe, 341 Md. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506 (Raker, J., concurring).
[d. at 535, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, j., concurring). Judge Raker did not interpret Ford to preclude transferred intent from being applied to all crimes of attempted murder. See id. (Raker, j., concurring).
Judge Raker cited persuasive authority to support her position. See id. at 535,
671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, j., concurring); see also Harrod v. State, 65 Md. App.
128, 137, 499 A.2d 959, 963 (1985); State v. Martin, 119 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo.
1938). But see State v. Gillette, 699 P.2d 626, 636 (N.M. 1985) (applying transferred intent to attempted murder although no one was injured).
313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988).
See Poe, 341 Md. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506 (Raker, j., concurring).
See Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 708-18, 625 A.2d 984, 996-1001 (1993).
See Poe, 341 Md. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506 (Raker, j., concurring).
See id. at 535, 671 A.2d at 506 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id. (Raker, J., concurring). Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion described
the Ford court's new limitation on the doctrine of transferred intent as dictum.
See Ford, 330 Md. at 726, 625 A.2d at 1005.
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Three years before Ford was decided, the court of appeals relied
on Wilson for the proposition that "[ t] he specific intent that is required [for attempted murder] may be a 'transferred' intent, that
is, the mens rea of a defendant as to his intended victim will be
transferred to an unintended victim who suffers injury as a result of
the defendant's attempt."175 Ford was the only Maryland case that
suggested limiting the doctrine of transferred intent to cases where
a death occurs. 176
Furthermore, Judge Raker was unimpressed with the analogy
the majority drew between felony murder and transferred intent. 177
The majority asserted that because felony murder and transferred
intent both impose criminal liability for unintended deaths, the two
concepts are interchangeable. 17s Thus, because felony murder is inapplicable when death does not result, the majority concluded that
transferred intent is inapplicable as well when death does not resuit. 179 Judge Raker illustrated that transferred intent should not be
subjected to the same limitations as felony murder because the two
doctrines are not interchangeable. ISO Under felony murder, courts
impute an intent on the actor committing a felony, whereas under
transferred intent, courts can only shift the defendant's intent from
the intended victim to the unintended victim. lSI Consequently,
transferred intent may apply to both the fatal and non-fatal injuries
that an unintended victim sustains.IS2
175. State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 163,571 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1990) (citing State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 609, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988».
176. Understandably, the Poe court gave weight to the Ford decision because Ford
was the most recent case interpreting Maryland's doctrine of transferred intent. See Poe, 341 Md. at 529, 671 A.2d at 503.
177. See Poe, 341 Md. at 535, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, j., concurring). The majority
found that felony murder and transferred intent were interchangeable; therefore, because one is not applied when there is no death, the other should not
apply either. See id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504 .
. 178. See id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504.
179. See id. at 536, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, j., concurring).
180. See id. (Raker, J., concurring).
181. See id. (Raker, J., concurring) ("Transferred intent can only function to 'shift'
the defendant's intent from one object to another, while felony murder may
be used to imply an intent from the defendant's act of committing a felony.");
see also People v. Carlson, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-24 (Ct. App. 1974) (asserting
that felony murder operates to remove the issue of malice from the trier of
fact, thereby relieving the trier of fact from having to find the malice element
of the crime of murder); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 157, at 922-24.
182. See State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 609, 671 A.2d 1041, 1045 (1988) (holding that
transferred intent is applicable even when no death results because injury to
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Additionally, Judge Raker disagreed with the majority's position
that the doctrine of transferred intent should be reserved for cases
where the bystander was killed. ls3 The doctrine has been held to aJr
ply to bystanders who endured non-fatal i~uries.ls4 Judge Raker asserted that reserving transferred intent only for situations where a
death occurs, as the majority held, is contrary to public policy.ls5 Because the policy reason for transferred intent is to guarantee proportionate punishment of criminal offenses and to prevent
criminals from escaping responsibility because of bad aim, it follows
that courts should apply the doctrine regardless of whether the bystander's injury is fatal or non-fatal. lS6
For Judge Raker, the Poe court held that transferred intent aJr
plies to a first degree murder of a bystander, regardless of whether
the defendant actually injured the intended victim.IS7 Judge Raker's
reasoning is more sound than the majority's because it does not
preclude the use of the doctrine in attempted murder prosecutions. ISS Judge Raker's clarification was in tune with the elements of
the doctrine as it is commonly applied.

B.

Impact of Poe v. State

After Poe v. State, Maryland' practItIOners can expect to debate
the applicability of transferred intent in cases where nobody is fatally wounded. For instance, the court will be concerned with the issue of whether the crime against the unintended victim is as serious
or more serious than the completed crime against the intended victim. IS9 Had Kimberly only been injured and not killed, the court
may not have transferred Poe's intent because the court was reluctant to apply the doctrine to attempted murder when there is no
death. l90 Also, prosecutors looking to invoke the doctrine should be
prepared to demonstrate that a defendant would be escaping responsibility for a crime if transferred intent is not invoked. Essentially, the court is hesitant to apply the doctrine when it creates two

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

an unintended victim, like death, is the result of the defendant's criminal intent) .
See Poe, 341 Md. at 536, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id.; see also People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1984).
See Poe, 341 Md. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id.
See id. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
See id. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 503-04.
See id.
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crimes out of one act. 191
Furthermore, if the majority's OpInIOn is interpreted to preclude the doctrine in attempted murder cases, this will likely help
defendants and hinder prosecutors. 192 For instance, suppose that A
attempted to kill B but instead only injured C without harming B.
The majority's holding would preclude transferring A's felonious intent to murder from B to C. Rather, A could only be charged with a
lesser crime, such as assault on C. Consequently, this interpretation
of the law will help defendants. Transferred intent, if applied in this
situation, would only provide prosecutors with a way to hold defendants liable for their intentional, illegal acts.
In the future, courts must distinguish between transferring intent and duplicating intent. Those courts that decline to invoke
transferred intent when nobody is injured reason that intent would
be duplicated if a defendant was charged with attempted murder of
both the intended and unintended victims. Those courts applying
transferred intent when the unintended victim is injured reason
that the law is in fact only transferring the intent in such a situation. The attempted murder charge for the act against the unintended victim is transferred because a person who purposefully
commits a crime is punished based upon their illegal intention, not
on whether they successfully executed the crime.
V.

CONCLUSION

Poe v. State addressed whether the doctrine of transferred intent
applies when a defendant, intending to kill one person, shoots and
wounds that person, but· the shot passes through the intended victim and kills an innocent bystander. 193 The majority's opinion extended Maryland law in one sense, but also limited the number of
situations where transferred intent is applicable. 194 In holding that
transferred intent applies when a bullet passes through the intended victim before killing an unintended victim, the court of appeals reaffirmed Maryland's commitment to preventing criminals
191. See id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 50~; see also Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 712, 625
A.2d 984, 998 (1993).
192. See Poe, 341 Md. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509.
193. See id. at 525, 671 A.2d at 502.
194. See id. at 531, 671 A.2d at 5()4.()5. The doctrine was extended to apply not only
when the defendant misses the intended victim, but also when the defendant
hits and wounds the intended victim. See id. However, the majority limited applications of transferred intent to the offense of murder where there is an unintended death. See id.
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from escaping responsibility due to poor aim. 195
The court went further, precluding application of the doctrine
to attempted murder when there is no death. 196 This presents a
problem because traditionally the doctrine has applied to injured
bystanders as well. Judge Raker clarified the majority's holding,
stating that transferred intent should apply to attempted murder
unless no one is injured. 197 In extending the doctrine to circumstances in which the intended victim is hit but not killed, the court
inadvertently narrowed the doctrine to apply only when a death occurs. Practitioners are left to debate the ambiguous impact Poe v.
State will have on Maryland law.
Daniel J Curry

195. See id. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker,
196. See id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
197. See id. at 534-35, 671 A.2d at 506.

J.,

concurring).

